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Earlier reporting on the 2026 outbreak

48 older paragraphs from the briefing, kept for the record and grouped by theme, newest first. Figures in them were current when written; the briefing has the latest numbers.

Last updated

Counts

Outside experts read the curve as a high plateau. DRC reports about 400 to 500 new confirmed cases a week, a number that appears stable, AP reported on 29 October; Boghuma Titanji of Emory University said cases are “not coming down, either” and that “the plateau is at a very, very high set point”. AP adds that fewer than a quarter of new cases come from known contacts, and Al Jazeera, reporting the 10,000 mark on 27 October, put about 80% of new cases outside the chains of transmission being monitored, against the 95% from known contacts Africa CDC sets for control. Africa CDC's director general, Jean Kaseya, said the continent is “not winning” the fight.

Both rankings are settled at WHO level. On 18 August the Director-General told the second IHR Emergency Committee that this is the second-largest Ebola outbreak ever recorded and the fastest-moving; on 17 August UN News reported WHO describing it as the deadliest in DRC's history. That second claim closes the comparison this page tracked through early August: the combined death toll passed the 2,299 of the 2018-2020 Kivu epidemic during the week ending 17 August, the last ranking Kivu led. Only the 2013-2016 West Africa epidemic, with more than 11,300 deaths, remains ahead.

Any read of the daily curve rests on notification counts WHO says undercount the epidemic by a factor of two to four. At a WHO briefing on 14 July, Dr Chikwe Ihekweazu, Executive Director of WHO's Health Emergencies Programme, put his name to the estimate: "We think, with some of our support and modelling, the scale of the outbreak is at least 2-4 times the number of cases we are finding." A figure ECDC carries from the WHO Africa Region situation report shows how much of the epidemic happens out of sight: 92.3% of 430 deaths investigated up to 5 July occurred in the community or before admission to a health facility. Africa CDC also cautions that part of the rise reflects cases and deaths only now being confirmed or recorded, so single-day movements should not be read as a clean incidence curve. The apparent case-fatality rate of 48.8% reflects confirmed-case reporting and will keep moving as late deaths and suspected cases are classified.

The assessments hardened on 20 and 21 August. On Friday 21 August, briefing reporters from Bunia, Julien Harneis, the UN's senior Ebola coordinator, called the growth exponential: more than 2,500 dead with half of those deaths in the preceding twenty days, an affected area now larger than France, and transmission outpacing the response. He put health-worker infections at about 160 including 43 deaths and warned that without more staff and resources reaching remote areas the epidemic will keep expanding and risks crossing into neighbouring countries. On the Thursday, 20 August, Africa CDC's head of emergency preparedness and response, Yap Boum II, estimated the official count may capture only 30 to 40% of actual infections, implying an outbreak up to three times the reported size; director general Jean Kaseya has said the epidemic is not under control, could eventually surpass the West African death toll unless the response changes, and has pointed to evidence suggesting transmission began around February, months before the 15 May declaration.

WHO's flagship products still lag national reporting, but the gap narrowed on 28 August. Disease Outbreak News 616, the first since 14 August, carries the 26 August cut, four days behind the source and level with ECDC. It supplies three numbers this page had been missing: the denominator behind the contact-tracing percentage, 22,091 contacts seen of 26,850 to follow up in the preceding 24 hours; PARTNERS trial enrolment above 250 confirmed cases; and 76 Ebola-related signals investigated across 23 countries and territories between 18 May and 28 August, of which 92% were ruled out, the first quantification we have of what international surveillance is actually catching. It also sets this outbreak's 48.1% case-fatality rate against the only two Bundibugyo outbreaks before it, 30% in Uganda in 2007 and 50% in DRC in 2012, and restates the risk assessment as very high for DRC and high for bordering countries. The earlier DON614 of 1 August remains the reference for health-worker infections (151 confirmed including 44 deaths as of 30 July) and for epidemiological week 30, then the worst of the outbreak at 567 cases and 296 deaths. This cut is taken from the INSP SitRep N°114 PDF itself and matches the ECDC outbreak page updated 7 September.

Current state: counts

Geography

A British health worker infected in DRC is being treated in London. A British person who had been helping with the outbreak response was flown to the UK by medevac and admitted to the high-consequence infectious disease unit at the Royal Free Hospital, the UK Health Security Agency said on 5 November; WHO's DON625 records it as the medical evacuation of one confirmed case, a health and care worker. UKHSA says the risk to the UK public remains low and that the flight does not raise it. Reuters described it on 4 November as the first case in a British national linked to this outbreak. As with the earlier cases evacuated to or diagnosed in Europe, EbolaIntel adds no separate count for the UK.

Sud-Ubangi became the seventh province in September. The province, in the north-west, bordering the Central African Republic and the Republic of the Congo, recorded its first confirmed Bundibugyo case on 10 September in Bulu health zone, also reported as Gbulu. The patient, a man who later died, had developed symptoms in Kisangani after travelling through Rwanda, Uganda and Ituri, then continued by river. Acting governor Jean-Rene Galekwa Vundawe said 38 contacts had been identified and placed in quarantine. Al Jazeera, reporting on 11 September, noted that local transmission had not yet been confirmed there; by 12 September ECDC lists seven provinces and 62 affected health zones. CDC's situation page of 11 September already named Sud-Ubangi among affected provinces. The province does not border any of the six already in the count, which is the first jump west of the eastern cluster.

Bas-Uele entered the count when a confirmed case with symptom onset on 4 August surfaced in Buta, a provincial hub with travel history to Haut-Uele; ECDC's 21 August update records two confirmed cases including one death there. The province had been on the preparedness list for weeks: DRC's Interior Ministry included Bas-Uele in its 30 June ban on mass gatherings, and a national rapid-response team was deployed there while it still counted zero cases. Preparedness became response within six weeks, which is the argument for doing it everywhere else too. Bas-Uele borders the Central African Republic and South Sudan to the north, and Africa CDC has flagged growing transmission there as making cross-border surveillance increasingly urgent.

Movement across the front lines in North Kivu is now also being restricted by an armed group rather than a state. On 21 August the M23 rebel administration announced that shared taxis and passenger boats between government-held and M23-held areas of the province would be suspended for one month from Saturday 22 August, after reports that two travellers had tested positive in a village under its control; other transport continues under strict health controls. North Kivu is the outbreak's second front, and on the 5 September province split its cumulative case-fatality ratio stands at 65.9%, by far the worst of the six provinces against 48.1% nationally.

The route into the two newest provinces is documented. On 30 June, Reuters reported that DRC health authorities were tracing possible spread to Haut-Uele and Tshopo, both linked to Ituri's Niania health zone. In Tshopo, the body of a pregnant woman who fell ill in Niania on 18 June and died on 27 June was carried about 300 kilometres by motorcycle to Kisangani, where a morgue sample tested positive. In Haut-Uele, two Niania contacts who had been placed in isolation fled to the province, one testing positive and the other awaiting confirmation, before both were returned to Niania. Haut-Uele borders South Sudan and the Central African Republic, and Tshopo lies west of Ituri around the Congo River hub of Kisangani, so Haut-Uele's involvement means the whole of DRC's northeast, home to about 15 million people, is now affected. Haut-Uele became the fourth officially affected province on 10 July and Tshopo the fifth by ECDC's 13 July update. INSP judged that although both provinces' cases appear imported from Nia-Nia in Ituri, both should be treated as epidemic zones.

Uganda's outbreak is over twice over. The Ministry of Health declared it ended on 28 July 2026, and WHO concurred on 26 August after 42 days without a new confirmed case, closing the four-week gap this page had been tracking between the two. The final count is 20 confirmed cases: 15 with travel links to DRC and five associated with local transmission, all within the two districts of Kampala and Wakiso in the Kampala metropolitan area. The most recent confirmed case was reported on 21 June and none followed. Those 20 cases and 2 deaths stay inside the cumulative headline, which counts the epidemic rather than the active caseload. The DRC outbreak is unaffected and its own 42-day clock has not started.

A fourth imported case reached Europe on 1 October. A health worker from Europe working for Médecins Sans Frontières in DRC tested positive for Bundibugyo virus on 29 September and was flown to the Netherlands for care in the high-level isolation unit at Leiden University Medical Center. ECDC says the three earlier imports were also linked to medical or humanitarian work in the affected areas, and that the risk to the general population in Europe remains very low. Like the earlier exported cases, it stays outside the headline.

France reported one imported confirmed case on 24 June in a doctor returning from a DRC transmission zone, now recovered. ECDC and CDC list it alongside two US citizens infected in DRC and treated in Germany, the first a doctor treated at Berlin's Charite hospital from May and discharged after about two weeks, the second a humanitarian worker admitted to Frankfurt University Hospital on 13 July. EbolaIntel notes all three separately and keeps them outside the headline, which counts DRC, Uganda and Kenya, so our total differs from running tallies that fold them in. Uganda and Rwanda have both closed their borders with DRC, and Africa CDC has named 10 at-risk neighbouring countries: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. WHO assesses risk as very high in DRC, high in Uganda and in countries bordering documented BDBV detection, and low for the rest of Africa and globally.

Two G7 countries have closed their borders over this outbreak, against WHO advice. A US CDC order suspends the entry of foreign nationals who have been in DRC, Uganda or South Sudan within the prior 21 days; a continuation was signed on 13 July for 30 days, and CDC's situation page records a further renewed order of 12 August keeping the restrictions in force. US citizens are exempt from that order but face a separate restriction: since 13 July the US has barred citizens who have been in DRC from boarding commercial flights home until they have spent at least 21 days in a third country, enforced through a do-not-board list, with case-by-case humanitarian exceptions. Samaritan's Purse, which has about 80 US citizens deployed in DRC and operates roughly 100 beds, said the requirement will impede staffing of treatment facilities; its chief executive Franklin Graham said it will "hurt us getting the staff that we need" and objected to health workers being treated "like they are damaged goods". Canada barred foreign nationals who have been in DRC in the previous 21 days from 20 July, and on 28 August, one day before that order was due to lapse, extended the measures for a further 30 days to 28 September 2026. The extension keeps the entry bar in place for foreign nationals who have been in DRC, Uganda or South Sudan in the previous 21 days including those already holding valid visas, holds immigration and visa decisions for residents of the three countries, and continues a 21-day quarantine for travellers returning from them. Ottawa describes its own domestic risk as low and the measures as precautionary, which is the same week WHO restated its advice against any restriction of travel to or trade with affected countries. US officials cited greater community spread into western DRC as their rationale; as of 10 September that characterisation is no longer only a stated basis, because Sud-Ubangi in the north-west is now in the official count, though still as a single imported case rather than established local transmission.

Current state: geography

Response

Measures and their costs are contested in Ituri. A notice from DRC's airports authority, the RVA, dated 8 November keeps all commercial flights to and from Bunia suspended until 8 February 2027, Radio Okapi reported; the airport closed to them a few days after the outbreak was declared, and local politicians and traders call the extension discriminatory against Ituri. In North Kivu, at least 50 pupils from 44 schools have tested positive and 31 of them have died, according to figures presented at a press briefing in Beni on 10 November; UNICEF says it has supplied hygiene kits to 300 schools in Beni and Butembo and will train 900 teachers. In Alimbongo, two health centres closed on 3 October after cases were notified reopened on 5 November and their 27 quarantined staff were released, and 13 recovered patients left the treatment centre at Beni's general hospital on 9 November.

Attacks and resistance continue elsewhere. In Mongbwalu, drivers working for the response blocked the general hospital's gates with their vehicles for most of 10 November, holding up ambulances, to demand the release of a colleague detained after a road accident that killed a police officer, Actualite.cd reported. In Tshopo, response work in Bafwasende remains suspended for insecurity, rumours there include calls to burn the general hospital, and safe burials have stalled: of 14 death alerts on 8 November one led to a safe burial, and of 10 on 9 November none. In Ituri the Avakubi checkpoint stays closed, and on 9 November up to 43% of travellers refused screening at Mongbwalu's Nzebi and Frigo checkpoints; in Sud-Ubangi refusals to wash hands reached 70% at Zongo. A grenade was found at the entrance of the Beni health-zone office, SitRep N°175 reported, and on 4 November youths forced their way into the Météo treatment centre in Kisangani to take a body.

Pay disputes keep slowing the response. Staff of the Oicha treatment centre in Beni territory wrote to the authorities on 4 November that none of them had received their allowance for four months, Radio Okapi reported; SitReps N°179 and N°180 say the July payment for 133 response workers in Oicha has since been made. Checkpoint staff in Ituri and Haut-Uele have not been paid for September and North Kivu's are three months behind, N°179 says, and four checkpoints in Nia-Nia did not operate over two months of late pay. Staff of the Kasenyi treatment centre remain on strike over unpaid wages, and the SitReps still list a strike at Tchomia, where AP reported a stoppage from 30 October. In Bas-Uele the strike covers the whole province and keeps four checkpoints in Viadana closed; in Haut-Uele treatment-centre staff cite demotivation over non-payment, and public health staff in Tshopo remain on strike.

Attacks on care continued in Beni territory after the raid on Cantine-Aloya. On the night of Friday 6 November, at about 10 pm, men tried to set fire to the Médecins Sans Frontières Ebola treatment centre in Beni's Biautu neighbourhood, where 36 patients were admitted; police exchanged fire with them, recovered bottles of petrol that had not exploded and reported no casualties. Police link the attack to the death that day of a young woman with confirmed Ebola, the wife of a suspected Wazalendo militiaman, whose husband's companions had tried to take her body; MSF, which condemned the attack, does not mention that link. WHO's Director-General wrote on 7 November that armed attacks on 5 and 6 November in the Mabalako health zone killed patients when three health facilities were burned, that people followed as contacts fled, and that response teams suspended planned work on 6 November: “The best medicine is peace.” Africa CDC condemned the Cantine-Aloya attack and called for a peace corridor to protect civilians, patients, health workers and facilities.

The Allied Democratic Forces, an Islamic State affiliate, had struck Cantine-Aloya, about 50 km west of Beni, on the night of 5 to 6 November, killing at least 33 civilians by a civil society count reported by AP and Reuters; the Kivu Security Tracker, cited by Actualite.cd, counts 35, among them 17 children. Houses, shops, pharmacies and health posts were burned. About 180 patients fled the Kelekele hospital centre, AP reported, and its medical director told Reuters that those who fled included one confirmed Ebola patient and five suspected cases, among them three high-risk contacts. By about midnight the hospital had emptied, isolated suspected patients included, the director told Radio Okapi, warning of possible spread into the surrounding Madiwe area. Africa CDC's statement speaks of hundreds of people with confirmed or suspected Ebola fleeing, more than the hospital's own count. The same day James Swan, who heads the UN mission MONUSCO, met North Kivu's governor in Beni; on 7 November community leaders in Beni called for simultaneous operations against the ADF by the Congolese and Ugandan armies, MONUSCO and Wazalendo groups.

Patients keep leaving care and teams keep meeting resistance. Between 18 and 24 October the SitReps record a confirmed patient escaping isolation in Wapinda, Nord-Ubangi, and another leaving the Boma Mangbetu treatment centre in Haut-Uele; a confirmed patient who had escaped from care in Isiro died in the community in Rungu, and four who escaped from the Bafwasende transit centre in Tshopo were still missing on 20 October. Decontamination teams were assaulted in Beni on 18 October, and on 22 October, in Tshopo, response teams were attacked at kilometre 15 on the Buta road and a community health worker's house was set on fire. On 24 October 39% of travellers at Ituri's Nzebi checkpoint refused screening, and 22 of 78 safe burials in Ituri could not be carried out. Capacity is uneven: North Kivu's beds for suspected cases were 97.9% full, with 147 patients cared for outside treatment and transit centres, while Ituri's centres held 422 patients at 40% occupancy and still lack blood.

North Kivu closed its border with Ituri for a week. The state news agency ACP reported on 18 October, as relayed by AP, that the province would bar people entering from Ituri for one week from Monday 19 October, cap motorcycles at two passengers and cars at four, and suspend large gatherings such as mass sports events, nightclubs and political demonstrations. WHO's Regional Director for Africa, Mohamed Yakub Janabi, told AP in Beni on 16 October: "We see pockets of Ebola generally going down, but unfortunately geographically it's spreading out." Getting people into care is still the hardest part: of 530 suspected cases validated on 16 October, 271 were transferred to a treatment or transit centre, and in Wamba, Haut-Uele, health workers now make home visits because residents are afraid to go to hospital. In Tshopo two confirmed patients escaped from care in Bafwasende and a patient's body was taken by force from a Red Cross burial team there on 14 October. The Musienene treatment centre in North Kivu began admitting patients on 16 October, and SitRep N°155 calls a 60-bed centre at Biakato in Ituri urgent.

Médecins Sans Frontières said on 6 October that the spread of Ebola in North Kivu is out of control. Stephanie Hoffmann, who coordinates its treatment centre in Butembo, told AP that most new cases come from unknown chains of transmission, that 75% of deaths happen in the community, and that the virus is moving from the city into rural areas with no support; MSF is calling for more treatment capacity. Attacks on the response continue. SitRep N°145 reports that the surveillance focal point of Kabondo health zone in Kisangani was seriously wounded with a machete during an investigation, and that a response team was attacked while tracing contacts around the community death of a patient who had absconded. In North Kivu the Butuhe checkpoint in Kalunguta zone has stayed closed since a security incident on 26 September in which a health worker was killed.

WHO's DON622 of 23 October describes sustained, high-level transmission in DRC alongside geographic expansion in the country and the region. Of the 482 deaths reported since DON619 of 8 October, 307 occurred in the community and 175 in treatment centres, which WHO reads as continuing gaps in early case detection and timely access to care. Fifty of the 66 affected zones reported a case in the preceding 21 days, led by Mandima, Beni and Bunia, and contact follow-up on 20 October was 79.7%, with North Kivu lowest at 73.3%. WHO says its rapid risk assessment, last set on 14 August at very high in DRC, high for countries sharing a land border and low for the rest of the region and globally, is being revised.

The last week of September brought violence around the response. On Sunday 27 September a local official of the ruling UDPS party was beaten to death at his home in Butembo, and the house set alight, after he defended the Ebola response and urged prevention on a radio programme, his party said, as reported by Reuters and AP. On the evening of Tuesday 29 September the Ebola transit centre in the Kigonze displacement camp on the outskirts of Bunia burned down; Julien Harneis, the UN senior Ebola coordinator, told AP that soldiers searching for weapons had burned the camp, forcing about 19,000 residents to flee.

UN News reported the Kigonze loss on 1 October without naming a cause. It is the camp where, as UN News reported on 3 August, International Medical Corps had opened a 100-bed treatment centre described as the largest in the country; reports so far name the facility lost as a transit centre. "When we lose a center, that means we lose capacity, we lose investment, and we have to start again," Harneis said. AP also reports surveillance workers in Bunia protesting months of unpaid wages under the slogan "No money, no data", and puts health-worker deaths from the virus above 50.

Money moved again at a ministerial meeting convened on 30 September under the US G20 presidency. Donors announced more than US$470 million in new funding, taking global commitments to the response past US$2 billion, according to figures reported by Actualite.cd on 1 October. The United States added US$267 million, for a direct contribution of US$887 million since May; the World Bank pledged US$90 million and the United Kingdom US$67.5 million, with Germany, France, South Korea, Italy, the United Arab Emirates, Japan and Australia also contributing.

The DRC government said on Friday 11 September that the outbreak is "under control" and that the peak was reached in the third week of August. EbolaIntel does not treat that claim as a turning point. Tedros said on 16 September that the fight is far from over, with weekly cases in North Kivu nearly doubling. On 15 September, at a Geneva briefing, WHO's Olivier le Polain said it is too early to confidently say a peak has been passed, and that bringing the outbreak fully under control will take many months. Julien Harneis, the UN senior Ebola coordinator, called it still a deadly and massive epidemic, with progress in some areas and growth in others, and said the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan is only 49% funded. INRB director general Jean-Jacques Muyembe, briefing in Kinshasa on 15 September after a visit to Bunia, said a national peak is hard to read because the provinces are on different slopes: Ituri, he said, is descending, while North Kivu has not yet reached a plateau. He told partners not to hear "under control" as the end of the outbreak, and said the response has to continue until the last positive contact. Those are his readings, alongside WHO's caution; they do not replace SitRep N°125. Kamba on 15 September put daily confirmations at about 80 against about 120 at the height; those figures are the minister's. SitRep N°125's 16 September window is 71 new confirmations, with North Kivu taking 38% of them. Bunia MP Iracan Gratien de Saint-Nicolas, speaking to the Guardian, warned against triumphalism.

Two assessments landed with the 3,000-death cut. A CDC MMWR Notes from the Field published 1 September, covering the 21 days to 21 August when DRC stood at 5,458 confirmed cases and 2,606 deaths, finds that five critical response indicators have not been met: only 15 to 20% of new confirmed cases had been identified as contacts against a target above 90%, 59% of confirmed deaths occurred outside a treatment unit, an average of 10.6 contacts were listed per case against a target of 20, laboratory testing covered 72% of validated alerts, and only 49% of affected health zones had a safe-burial team. CDC describes that combination as uncontrolled expansion. The same day, UN relief chief Tom Fletcher told member states that an incremental response is no longer enough for an exponentially growing epidemic. He put the revised 2026 humanitarian plan at $2.1 billion, about half funded, with a $1.1 billion gap remaining, and said he has allocated more than $57 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund for Ebola response and preparedness in DRC and neighbouring countries. Schools reopened across DRC on 1 September, including in Ituri, against a call from the provincial teachers' union to delay; available health data put the case-fatality rate among children aged 4 and under at 60%, the highest of any age group in this outbreak.

The heads of WHO, the WHO African Region and Africa CDC published a joint commentary on 25 August, under a title arguing that the deadliest Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak can be stopped. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Mohamed Yakub Janabi and Jean Kaseya call this DRC's seventeenth Ebola outbreak, the second largest ever recorded and moving faster than any before it, fuelled by insecurity from decades of armed conflict; they put it at 5,290 confirmed cases and 2,516 deaths across 56 health zones as of 21 August, with 158 health workers infected and 45 dead. Their ask is arithmetic rather than rhetoric: surveillance, treatment centres, infection prevention and community engagement all scaled to two or three times current capacity. The commentary names no vaccine and no therapeutic anywhere in its prescription, which is the shape of this outbreak in one detail. The case for stopping it rests entirely on response infrastructure, because no licensed medical countermeasure targets the strain causing it.

Africa CDC and WHO issued a joint call on 6 August, after a senior delegation visited the affected provinces, for an urgent scale-up of community-led response. They reported DRC at 3,973 confirmed cases, 1,801 deaths and 776 recoveries across 51 health zones as of 4 August, and named resistance to some response activities, misinformation and population movement as the barriers. Their prescription is the one Kaseya has repeated since June: communities directly involved in surveillance, referrals, treatment, safe and dignified burials and decisions affecting their families, testing and treatment brought closer to where people live, treatment capacity expanded, and frontline health workers protected, equipped, supported and paid on time. The last of those remains unsettled in the official record more than three weeks after the Rwampara and Bunia strikes began.

The largest funding movement of the outbreak was announced on 5 August. The US Department of State said it intends, working with Congress, to provide an additional US$242 million for Ebola response and preparedness in DRC and Uganda and for related humanitarian assistance, taking total direct State Department assistance for this outbreak past US$512 million and making the United States the largest single financial contributor to the response. The announcement is aligned with the commitment of up to a further US$500 million made at the G7 leaders summit on 16 June. The release describes the money as covering emergency operations, surveillance and early detection, isolation and treatment, laboratory strengthening, community engagement and screening at points of entry, and reports nearly 300 metric tonnes of supplies distributed, support to more than 180 health facilities and more than 8.6 million health screenings. It sits against an Africa CDC estimate that the whole response needs about US$1.4 billion, and alongside the entry restrictions from the same government that organisations running treatment beds say impede staffing. Marking one hundred days since the declaration, Africa CDC director general Jean Kaseya told AFP on 23 August that partners have promised about US$1 billion and that roughly US$700 million is already counted as committed, and he pressed for the money to reach the organisations working on the ground. The Director-General posted on X on 22 August, quoted by AFP, calling on all actors to do more to end the epidemic.

Treatment capacity is growing with it. UN News reported on 3 August that the International Medical Corps had opened a 100-bed Ebola treatment centre at the Kigonze displacement camp on the outskirts of Bunia, described as the largest in the country, with US support. Reporting back from Bunia at a WHO briefing on 14 July, Dr Chikwe Ihekweazu said treatment capacity there was close to 800 beds and rising weekly and that laboratory capacity had grown from 1 laboratory to 14, but that despite this "we have not caught up in the race". He named four constraints still holding the response back: a funding gap, attacks on health centres, the armed conflict in eastern DRC, and community mistrust. On 7 July, WHO's representative in DRC, Dr Anne Ancia, put the assessment plainly: "We would like to say it is stabilising, but frankly, we cannot say it yet."

The response is also disrupted from inside. On 13 July, dozens of staff at the Rwampara Ebola treatment centre in Bunia, among them epidemiologists, case investigators, drivers and gravediggers, stopped work over salaries and bonuses unpaid since the outbreak was declared, closing the facility and blocking its access road; strikers said suspending care and clinical surveillance would leave hospitalised patients with almost no chance. Health workers at Bunia General Hospital also walked out, and INSP confirmed that continuity of essential health services in Bunia and Rwampara had been compromised. Staff agreed on 14 July to resume work on condition the government paid within 72 hours, and health minister Roger Kamba said the delay came from verifying the response payroll after unrelated names were added to it. Work resumed after Ituri's military governor, Major-General Gaby Kasongo Mulumba, met the response's strategic coordination on 15 July, but the deadline passed without payment.

At a press briefing in Bunia on 18 July, officials committed to paying the arrears and announced corrective measures rather than a date: validating personnel lists, digitalising the payment system and shifting progressively to digital payments. They attributed the arrears to administrative and logistical problems rather than to a lack of money, and Radio Okapi reported on 19 July that no payment date had been given. The dispute remains unresolved in the official record: the 18 July situation report still lists non-payment of response workers among its principal challenges and records the impact as an interruption of response activities including safe and dignified burials. SOS Medias Burundi reported on 18 July that the action had spread to Butembo, Beni and Kisangani; that rests on a single outlet and we have not corroborated it. On 25 July a fresh walkout hit Bunia's Elikya treatment centre, where the Associated Press reported about 100 doctors, nurses and security staff stopped work over two months of unpaid performance bonuses; the response's operations chief Adelard Lufongola said the same day that payments were being cleared through mobile money. Rwampara and Bunia are the same two sites hosting the EBO-PEP prophylaxis trial.

Security is the other constraint, and it is quantified. On 18 July the Associated Press reported at least a dozen attacks on health facilities and health workers during this outbreak, attributed to Pierre Akilimali, incident manager for the response. Response staff have been held captive in some health zones and safe-burial teams threatened in cemeteries, and safety fears are pushing health and aid workers to withdraw from remote communities into Bunia, shrinking the surveillance footprint precisely where undetected chains are suspected. The most recent incident was at Nyankunde in Ituri on 15 July, where a crowd attacked the hospital and the adjoining treatment centre after a woman who had come to give birth died of severe anaemia when the hospital declined a blood transfusion her family offered, transfusions being restricted under outbreak protocol. Stones were thrown, the perimeter fence was damaged, several patients escaped, the medical team withdrew and the generator stopped working; Samaritan's Purse evacuated staff and treatment resumed the next day. The situation report also records an attack on safe-burial teams at the Muchanga bridge and community resistance at Komanda and Mandima, and attributes access constraints to the armed groups CODECO and ADF. UN OCHA has recorded 76 security incidents affecting response and aid workers across Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, with 45 wounded; on 7 July attackers raided a treatment centre in Butembo and set part of it alight.

The 18 July report keeps numbers on capacity: 724 patients in isolation, 272 confirmed and 452 suspected, against 857 beds nationally, an occupancy rate of 84.5%. North Kivu was over its limit at 123.1%, with 181 patients in 141 beds, while Ituri ran at 76.3% and Tshopo at 40%. The Musienene health zone in North Kivu, which has no treatment or transit centre at all, took four of that province's 16 new confirmed cases. Only 175 of 1,170 triage units in Ituri were functional, with shortages of protective equipment and chlorine listed among the drivers of frontline infections, and four patients absconded from treatment structures in 24 hours. Of the 40 deaths confirmed that day, 30 were community deaths detected by post-mortem swab and 10 occurred inside a treatment centre, the ratio that keeps the response behind the virus. Surveillance volume is high: 872 alerts in a day, 825 investigated within 24 hours, validating 192 suspected cases of whom 80 were community deaths. Laboratory positivity was 38.1% in Ituri against 12.6% in North Kivu, and national test positivity has since been reported above 40%, a rate that is itself evidence of under-testing.

The operational numbers peaked in late August and have slipped. ECDC put contact-tracing follow-up at 88% of identified contacts as of 31 August, up from 86.3% the day before and from 82.3% on 26 August; the 5 September cut is back at 85.7%, still below the 95% operational target, always a share of identified contacts rather than of the contacts that exist. Africa CDC director general Jean Kaseya had dropped the hedging in remarks to the Associated Press published by STAT News on 4 August: "Contact tracing is not working." He put the share of new cases arising outside traced chains at 60 to 70%. WHO's Disease Outbreak News of 28 August supplies the denominator behind the 26 August figure: 22,091 contacts seen out of 26,850 listed for follow-up in the preceding 24 hours, so the roughly 4,800 people missed on a single day are the arithmetic behind the gap Kaseya describes. Isolation facilities now hold 851 patients and recoveries have reached 1,548 in DRC. Earlier in the response, WHO reported treatment capacity growing from fewer than 10 beds to more than 500 across 19 health centres and laboratory capacity to more than 2,000 tests a day, alongside more than 21,000 community health workers in training. On 16 July the Global Fund approved US$4.6 million for an intensified malaria response across four Ituri health zones, explicitly to protect the Ebola response by reducing the number of febrile patients who present as suspected Ebola cases and occupy isolation beds. On 15 July, Medecins Sans Frontieres appealed for an urgent scale-up of the international medical response in Ituri, reporting that its 90-bed Elikiya centre in Bunia is almost always at full capacity, so patients keep arriving late and critically ill. On 2 July the UN Development Programme estimated the outbreak could cut DRC economic output by more than US$1 billion and push nearly one million more people into poverty.

Response planning now reaches beyond the seven affected provinces. Reporting on 21 August described a plan to block transmission toward the major riverside population centres, above all Kinshasa, a megacity of nearly 20 million where no Ebola case has been confirmed, while reducing the risk of cross-border spread to the Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic; Africa CDC framed it as also addressing the distrust that has produced delayed treatment and resistance to response teams. Community hostility persists: NPR reported that residents attacked a health team in the territory of Aru on 17 August after a suspected case was reported there, setting fire to an ambulance and damaging two other vehicles. Save the Children estimates at least 180 Congolese children have lost both parents or caregivers since the outbreak began.

The violence has an operational bill. Detailing the weekend's incidents on 19 August, RFI reported that motorcycle riders attacked a response team in Aru territory on 17 August and vandalised ambulances, wounding one paramedic; UN coordinator Julien Harneis called that attack unacceptable in a statement from Bunia. The same account has local youths sacking Kandoy hospital in the Biringi health zone as an ambulance arrived to collect two suspected cases: the driver was left gravely injured and in a coma, and the two suspected cases vanished along with other recovering post-operative patients. Two days earlier, the response opened only 21 of the 171 decontamination rings planned in Ituri, abandoned a safe burial at Epulu-Zunguluka in Mambasa, saw a nurse assaulted at Apodo in Haut-Uele and lost a body to a community at Tuluba before it could be sampled. Ambulances are scarce: two broken down in Ituri, five operational in North Kivu, ten requested for Haut-Uele.

Current state: response

Countermeasures

On 2 July, WHO announced that patient enrolment had begun in the PARTNERS trial, the Platform Adaptive Randomised Trial for New and Repurposed Filovirus TreatmentS, the first clinical trial of treatments for Bundibugyo virus disease, which enrolled its first patient in Bunia. Sponsored by WHO and coordinated by the Congolese National Institute of Biomedical Research, the Institute of Tropical Medicine in Antwerp and the University of Oxford, it randomises patients of any age with confirmed disease to standard care alone, standard care plus MBP134, standard care plus remdesivir, or both drugs plus standard care, with mortality at 28 days as the primary endpoint and a target of 700 to 1,000 participants over six months. The United States and Gilead Sciences are donating the doses. On 18 August the Director-General reported enrolment had reached 100 patients across three facilities in Ituri, WHO's Disease Outbreak News of 28 August put it above 250 confirmed cases across the same three sites, and Disease Outbreak News 617 of 10 September above 300 across five facilities in Ituri. Separately, a CDC MMWR Notes from the Field published 10 September reviews all 21 Uganda cases: 18 of 20 confirmed patients survived after remdesivir under a compassionate-use protocol at Mulago, and the two confirmed deaths were among patients recognised late. CDC is careful: this is not a randomised comparison, and it frames the finding as a reason to consider a remdesivir trial rather than as proof of efficacy. No licensed treatment targets Bundibugyo virus.

A third Bundibugyo-specific candidate has US money for its first human trial. IAVI said on 28 October that the US Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) awarded it US$36 million under a contract worth up to US$99 million for its single-dose rVSV-based vaccine, covering doses for clinical evaluation and outbreak response, a Phase 1 trial and an updated candidate matched to the 2026 outbreak variant. Hilleman Laboratories makes the first doses, SK bioscience leads scale-up and its German subsidiary IDT Biologika fills and finishes. The candidate has protected nonhuman primates but has not yet been tested in humans; IAVI's stated goal is a ring-vaccination trial in DRC after Phase 1.

On 17 August the International Coordinating Group informed Kinshasa of an initial release of 70,000 doses from the global stockpile: 20,000 for a Phase 3 randomised trial against Bundibugyo virus, recommended by WHO's candidate vaccine prioritisation group on 31 July, and 50,000 for frontline and health workers under SAGE recommendations, which means some people will receive it outside any trial. WHO adds that early laboratory and animal data suggest it may provide some protection, and that informed consent is essential. A May advisory-group conclusion that confined Ervebo to research settings has in practice been superseded for frontline workers while the licensing fact stands. Gavi is funding the operation with US$7 million for the shipment and a further US$6 million for vaccination activities in high-risk areas.

The campaign began on Thursday 27 August, when health minister Roger Kamba gave the first dose to a health worker in Kisangani, the provincial capital of Tshopo, more than three months into the emergency. More than 50,000 of the released doses had reached the country by then, after a first tranche of more than 16,000 landed on 22 August. The rollout starts in Tshopo, Bas-Uele and Haut-Uele, the three least affected of the six counted provinces, and works inward: "We will cover all the provinces that are around Ituri, moving in the ring towards the centre", Kamba said, having framed the priority as protecting "first those who are on the front line". Officials describe the frontline-worker component as compassionate use, the route that allows an unapproved product to be given in a serious disease, and their stated rationale is that the two viruses are related closely enough that Ervebo may cross-protect. That is a hypothesis rather than a finding. It is what the 20,000-dose trial is designed to test, and until it reports there is no human efficacy data for Ervebo against Bundibugyo virus. SitRep N°125 records 2,810 of 11,703 targeted frontline workers vaccinated in Tshopo as of 16 September, 24.0%, and 600 in Bas-Uele, 550 at Buta and 50 at Ganga. Ituri, which holds 77.5% of the cumulative case count, was still preparing its Bunia rollout. None of this changes the strain problem: Ervebo is licensed for Zaire ebolavirus only and has no established efficacy against Bundibugyo virus.

On 14 July, recruitment opened in Ituri for EBO-PEP, the first trial of any post-exposure prophylaxis against Bundibugyo virus. It tests obeldesivir, an investigational oral antiviral developed by Gilead with no Bundibugyo-specific human efficacy data, in nearly 1,000 participants aged over 12 who had direct contact with a confirmed case within the previous five days and are symptom-free at enrolment, with daily monitoring for 21 days and a final visit at day 42. The first PEP centres sit alongside the ALIMA-run treatment centres in Bunia and Rwampara. It is coordinated by ALIMA with DRC's INRB and France's ANRS Emerging Infectious Diseases, supported by Medecins Sans Frontieres and Africa CDC, and funded by EUR 3.4 million from the Global Health EDCTP3 partnership, US$1 million from Africa CDC and US$5 million combined from DRC and South Africa. Several newsrooms have described it as a Gilead-run trial, which it is not. A secondary protocol offers compassionate-use remdesivir to children under 12 and to pregnant or breastfeeding women, who are excluded from the obeldesivir arm.

On 13 July, the Oxford Vaccine Group launched BD-Ebov, the world's first Phase 1 trial of a Bundibugyo vaccine candidate, testing ChAdOx1 BDBV for safety and immune response in 50 healthy adults aged 18-55 in Oxford. On 24 July it vaccinated the first volunteer, the first time ChAdOx1 BDBV has been given to a human, with further volunteers being enrolled and dosed over the following weeks. UN News reported on 4 August that a second Bundibugyo-specific vaccine trial had started in Canada that week, and on 18 August the Director-General stated that two vaccines designed specifically against Bundibugyo virus have entered human trials; the second is Moderna's mRNA-1469, which received its first human dose in Nova Scotia on 3 August in a Phase 1 trial at three Canadian sites with about 80 healthy adults, registered as NCT07737717 and funded by CEPI. On 30 July CEPI announced up to US$8.5 million for Hilleman Laboratories, an MSD and Wellcome joint venture, to develop and manufacture rVSV-platform Bundibugyo vaccine doses for clinical trials from IAVI-generated seed material. Nothing here is approved: every product named on this page remains investigational, and no Bundibugyo vaccine or therapeutic has received Emergency Use Listing or prequalification.

On 1 June, CEPI committed up to US$62 million to fast-track three BDBV vaccine candidates: up to US$50 million for a Moderna mRNA candidate, US$8.6 million for the Oxford ChAdOx1 BDBV candidate, and US$3.2 million for the IAVI rVSV-BDBV candidate, covering preclinical work and Phase 1 trials. On 9 June it added US$1.9 million to Public Health Vaccines LLC to generate master viral seed stock for a second rVSV-based Bundibugyo candidate, a fourth developer alongside Moderna, Oxford and IAVI.

The only regulatory milestone this outbreak has produced is diagnostic rather than preventive or therapeutic: on 2 July WHO added the first Bundibugyo virus test to its Emergency Use Listing, an RT-qPCR kit from Shanghai ZJ Bio-Tech that detects and distinguishes pathogenic ebolavirus species. No vaccine and no therapeutic has received Emergency Use Listing or prequalification for Bundibugyo virus, a point the International Pandemic Preparedness Secretariat restated in its 100 Days Mission Day 60 report on 16 July.

Alongside the trials, the wider response architecture: WHO and Africa CDC launched a six-month US$518 million continental preparedness and response plan on 5 June covering June to November 2026, DRC President Tshisekedi announced a national response plan budgeted at US$319 million on 30 June, and CDC said on 18 June that it had more than 125 staff in DRC and Uganda and had accessed US$107 million in emergency funding. On 17 June, WHO issued filovirus clinical-management guidelines covering Bundibugyo virus disease, with emphasis on early recognition, rapid referral, optimized supportive care, laboratory monitoring, careful rehydration, shock management, antibiotics when bacterial infection is present, and structured after-care for survivors.

Current state: countermeasures